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Commissions: Reports: El Salvador (MSG Assasinations)
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Truth Commissions: Reports: El
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United States Institute of Peace LibraryTruth Commissions: Reports: El Salvador
2. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS SUMMARY OF THE CASE At around 9 p.m. on 19 June 1985, in an area of San Salvador known as the "Zona Rosa" where there are many restaurants, a group of armed men opened fire on a group of United States marines. The assailants were members of the Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC), one of the organizations in FMLN. The marines, who were serving as security guards at the United States Embassy in San Salvador, were in civilian clothing and were unarmed. Four marines, nine civilians and one of the assailants died in the shoot-out. The "Mardoqueo Cruz" urban commando of PRTC claimed responsibility for the killings; FMLN defended the attack in a communiqué. In a subsequent trial, three people were tried and convicted. Two other trials were instituted for the same attack. One of them did not reach the sentencing stage, since the accused was amnestied; in the other, sentence has yet to be passed on the accused. The Commission finds the following: 1. The attack on the United States marines was part of the FMLN policy of considering United States military personnel a legitimate target. 2. A PRTC commando carried out the attack. 3. Ismael Dimas Aguila and José Roberto Salazar Mendoza were involved in planning and carrying out the attack. 4. Pedro Antonio Andrade was also involved in planning the attack. 5. The attack on the marines in the Zona Rosa was a violation of the rules of international humanitarian law. DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS 471 Background In 1985, the General Command of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional took the decision to consider United States military personnel in El Salvador legitimate military targets. It gave its members broad and sweeping orders to implement the decision. 472 Planning the attack In early June 1985, some members of the Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC), one of the five political-military organizations in FMLN, planned an attack which they called "Yankee aggressor in El Salvador, another Viet Nam awaits you". The aim was to execute United States military personnel assigned to El Salvador and responded to the general directive to that effect issued earlier by the General Command. The attack was to be carried out by members of the "Mardoqueo Cruz" urban commando. The commando operated from an auto repair shop in which Ismael Dimas Aguilar and his brother José Abraham were partners and from the "La Estrella" upholstery shop in which William Celio Rivas Bolaños and Juan Miguel García Meléndez were partners. The main planning meetings were therefore held in those places. 473 The attack At around 8.30 p.m. on 19 June 1985, six United States marines who were responsible for security at the United States Embassy sat down at an outside table at Chili's restaurant in the area known as the "Zona Rosa" in the San Benito district. They were regular customers known to the owners of restaurants and cafes in the area and to those who worked there. They used to go there in groups whenever they were off duty. 474 After a while, two of them left the group and went to sit down at a table in the Flashback restaurant a few yards away from their companions at Chili's. 475 At around 9 p.m., a white pick-up truck with dark stripes parked outside the La Hola restaurant; a group of some seven individuals got out and walked over to Chili's and, without warning, fired a volley of shots at United States marines 476 Thomas Handwork, Patrick R. Kwiatkoski, Bobbie J. Dickson and Gregory H. Weber. The marines were in civilian clothing. There is no evidence that they were carrying weapons. While the attackers were firing at the United States marines, someone returned their fire from inside Chili's and the Mediterranée restaurant. 477 A member of the commando was wounded in the cross-fire. 478 The following people were also shot and died at the scene: Humberto Sáenz Cevallos, lawyer, Secretary of the Faculty of Law at José Matías Delgado University; Humberto Antonio Rosales Pineda, Executive Director of Inter Data Corporation; Arturo Alonso Silva Hoff, student; José Elmer Vidal Peñalva, university student; Oswaldo González Zambroni, Guatemalan businessman; Richard Ernest Mac Ardie Venturino, Chilean executive of the WANG corporation; George Viney, United States citizen, Regional Director of WANG; and Roberto Alvidrez, United States citizen and WANG executive. Some of these people had been sitting in Chile's, others in the Mediterranée. 479 There is no evidence that any of the civilians who died were armed. 480 Other people at the scene were wounded. A few minutes after the commando withdrew, staff from the United States Embassy arrived on the scene and drove the four marines to a first aid post. At 9.30 p.m., members of the National Police arrived on the scene but, according to their report, were unable to make a satisfactory inspection because only eight of the bodies were there and the scene of the incident had already been disturbed. 481 That same night, the other members of the commando took José Roberto Salazar Mendoza, who had been seriously wounded in the attack, to a Salvadorian Red Cross post. He died from his wound. 482 Subsequent statements Three days later, on 22 June 1985, the Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC) claimed responsibility for the operation in a communiqué signed by "Fernando Gallardo" of the political and military headquarters of the "Mardoqueo Cruz" urban guerrilla commando of PRTC. On 25 June 1985, the FMLN General Command issued a communiqué supporting the operation and asserting that the four marines were a legitimate military target. 483 The Commission has full evidence, however, that the United States marines were not combatants. Their function was to guard the United States Embassy and there is no indication whatsoever that they took part in combat actions in El Salvador. Furthermore, international humanitarian law defines the category of "combatant" restrictively. The allegation that they were performing "intelligence functions" has not been substantiated. In any event, carrying out intelligence functions does not, in itself, automatically place an individual in the category of combatant. In a subsequent broadcast on Radio Venceremos, Ismael Dimas Aguilar acknowledged that, as one of the military chiefs of the "Mardoqueo Cruz" urban commando responsible for the operation, he had participated in its planning and in the execution of the marines. 484 On 28 August 1985, then President of the Republic José Napoleón Duarte held a press conference to report on the results of the investigation into what he called the "Zona Rosa Massacre". He said that three of the people responsible for the operation had been arrested. José Abraham Dimas Aguilar and Juan Miguel García Meléndez, who had planned the operation, and William Celio Rivas Bolaños, who had helped carry it out. The judicial proceedings On 27 August 1985, the National Guard placed the three accused at the disposal of the military court and handed over the results of the investigation, including the confession of the three defendants. 485 Rivas and García later said that their confessions had been obtained under torture. The documents of the investigation were incomplete, since they did not include autopsy or ballistic reports, a reconstruction of events, or other reports customary in the investigation of a case of this kind. 486 Sentence was passed only five years later, on 30 April 1991, in the court of first instance. Although it appears from the dossier that the extrajudicial confessions were generally confirmed, there is no record that the defendants ever appeared in court, that any statement was taken from them or that any effort whatsoever was made to clarify the facts. Two years after the trial began, the defendants' lawyer requested the dismissal of proceedings against them under the 1987 Amnesty Act. 487 On 12 November 1987, the court granted the request and dismissed all charges against the three defendants. 488 The United States Consul General in San Salvador representing the family of one of the dead United States marines went to court to file an appeal against the amnesty. 489 On 4 December 1987, the military court confirmed the dismissal on grounds that the offences had been political. 490 On 22 February 1988, President Napoleón Duarte, to whom, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the decision of the military court was referred, overturned it on the grounds 491 that the Zona Rosa killings were ordinary crimes of international significance and, as such, not subject to amnesty. The Supreme Court of Justice, before which the matter was brought by means of a remedy of habeas corpus, confirmed the decision. On 30 April 1991, sentence was passed in the court of the first instance and the three defendants were found guilty; the sentence was confirmed, almost in its entirety, on 5 March by the relevant court. On 25 September 1992, the military judge decided to wait until he had seen the report of the Commission on the Truth before ruling on the request from the defendants' lawyer that the National Reconciliation Act be applied to the defendants, saying that the report was indispensable in order to determine whether the amnesty provided for in that Act was applicable. 492 While this trial was going on, two other defendants went on trial for the same incident. One trial, that of Juan Antonio Morales, began in 1988. Morales confessed to the Treasury Police that he had been part of the commando that had carried out the Zona Rosa operation and he confirmed his statement to the judge of the Fifth Criminal Court. Although his version of events is substantially the same as the one given by Rivas, García and Dimas, he did not name them as having been among the participants. There was no joinder of the two trials, and he has still not been sentenced. After a number of procedural vicissitudes, those implicated were denied the benefit of amnesty. Morales is still being held. 493 The other trial, for complicity, was instituted in 1989 before the Third Criminal Court against Pedro Antonio Andrade, nom de guerre "Mario González". 494 This trial too was not joined to the earlier one. Unlike the other defendants, Andrade benefited from the 1987 amnesty. The Commission has received sufficient evidence that Andrade was one of the people who planned the attack. Andrade was head of the "Mardoqueo Cruz" urban commando at the time the incident occurred and he confessed in court to having had prior knowledge of an attack planned against "los cheles" (foreigners) and having made arrangements for a safe house and for medical care in case anyone was wounded in the operation. However, the Commission has received credible information that Andrade had a wider role in the selection of specific targets and in other aspects of the attack. FINDINGS The Commission finds the following: 1. There is full evidence that the attack on the United States marines was part of the FMLN policy of considering United States military personnel a legitimate target of war. 2. There is full evidence that the "Mardoqueo Cruz" urban commando of PRTC carried out the attack and that PRTC, as the organization to which this commando belongs, bears responsibility for the incident. 3. There is substantial evidence that Ismael Dimas Aguilar planned the attack and that he himself fired on the marines. 4. There is sufficient evidence that Pedro Antonio Andrade was involved in planning the attack. 5. The attack on the marines in the Zona Rosa was a violation by FMLN of the rules of international humanitarian law. SUMMARY OF THE CASE Herbert Ernesto Anaya Sanabria, leader of the Human Rights Commission (non-governmental), was shot and killed on the morning of 26 October 1987 in the parking lot outside his home in San Salvador. Two months later, National Police arrested a young man, Jorge Alberto Miranda Arévalo, a member of ERP, who initially stated that he had taken part in the murder as the look-out. He later retracted his confession. In 1991, a jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to the maximum penalty of 30 years in prison. The Commission finds that: 1. For this case, it did not have sufficient time to resolve the following dilemma: the fact that there was evidence that a State security force or a death squad might have been responsible, and also evidence that the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) might have been responsible for the murder of Herbert Ernesto Anaya Sanabria. 2. Miranda's trial and his treatment by the police violated his basic rights. 3. The State failed in its duty under international law to protect human rights, properly investigate the murder of Herbert Anaya and bring to trial and punish the culprits. DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS 495 The murder On 26 October 1987, Herbert Anaya was shot to death in the parking lot of his home in the Zacamil district. According to witnesses, three men took a direct part in the murder: one fired the shots, another acted as look out for the first and the third 496 drove the vehicle. 497 The murderers escaped in an old, yellow pick-up truck. Ballistic tests showed that the six cartridges had been fired from the same weapon, 498 and also that the six bullets found had been fired from the same weapon. 499 The Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts (CIHD) maintained that the bullets were not typical of the ammunition available to the armed forces of El Salvador.500 Background At the time he was murdered, Herbert Anaya was general coordinator of the Human Rights Commission (non-governmental) (CDHES-NG)501 and used to speak out regularly against human rights violations. He was also a member of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo.502 Before his death, he apparently advocated a peaceful solution to the armed conflict in his country.503 On 26 May 1986, he was arrested by members of the Treasury Police who were dressed in civilian clothing and heavily armed.504 He was interrogated and imprisoned 505 until 2 February 1987, when he was released in an exchange of prisoners. Reaction to the murder The murder triggered a strong reaction both within El Salvador and abroad. There were demonstrations in the capital and national and international human rights groups and civilian associations expressed their concern. 506 President Duarte asked CIHD to investigate the case and also offered a reward of 50,000 colones (US$ 10,000).507 The investigation did not produce any significant results, and the possibility that Anaya might have been murdered by Government forces or right-wing sectors was not seriously investigated. Arrest and detention of Jorge Alberto Miranda Arévalo On 23 December 1987, National Police arrested Jorge Alberto Miranda Arévalo, a member of a union of the ERP urban commandos.508 Miranda and a companion had attacked a truck carrying soft drinks. His companion "Carlos", who, according to Miranda's first statement, shot at Anaya, managed to escape. Miranda was interrogated509 and, according to the National Police, made an extrajudicial statement confessing to having participated as look out in Anaya's murder. According to the court dossier, that same day he led members of the National Police to arms caches. During the first weeks of his detention, Miranda said that he had been subjected to psychological pressure.510 He said he had been injected with an unknown substance,511 and also that he had been subjected to sleep deprivation. The Government concluded that Miranda was guilty. When the Government paid Miranda 12,000 colones on 4 January 1988, saying that the payment was being made under a programme announced in December 1987, the Minister of Justice denied that Miranda was being rewarded for taking the blame for the murder.512 During the first weeks of his imprisonment, Miranda received special treatment: he was interviewed on camera and visited alone by foreign reporters513 and also by senior officials. Miranda says he was also visited by members of the National Police and by some Venezuelans who offered him comforts if he stuck to his original statement.514 For its part, CIHD concluded its investigation shortly after Miranda's arrest. According to the dossier, CIHD did not pursue leads or update important information, spoke to few witnesses and did not compare the results of ballistic tests of the ammunition used in the murder with ammunition handed over by Miranda. Judicial proceedings against Miranda When he had been held nine days longer than the maximum time allowed by the Salvadorian Constitution without being brought before a judge,515 Miranda was brought before the judge of the First Criminal Court of San Salvador516 [on 4 January 1988], the day he received his payment from the Government. That same day, Miranda confirmed his extrajudicial statement before the judge. Nevertheless, one month later, he retracted his statement about the assassination, although he reaffirmed that he was a member of ERP.517 After two years during which little headway was made, the judge ordered a partial stay of proceedings in Miranda's favour in April 1990, "... because of the absence of the necessary evidence of his participation".518 Subsequently, the First Criminal Chamber of the First Central Section revoked the stay519 and brought the case to trial. In October 1991, a jury of five persons found Jorge Miranda guilty of murder and acts of terrorism. 520 In March 1992, the judge applied the
National Reconciliation Act to Miranda in respect of the offence of
acts of terrorism and subversive association, but not in respect of the
murder, and gave Miranda the maximum sentence of 30 years in prison.521 ERP No ERP member interviewed by the Commission has claimed responsibility for Anaya's murder, nor has any witness identified Miranda as a participant. One eyewitness who claimed to have seen the murderers from close up was unable to identify Miranda when shown a series of photographs of young men, including Miranda.523 Nonetheless, there is evidence that ERP and Miranda may have participated in the murder, and there are even credible motives. There were disagreements between Anaya and ERP. There is evidence that Anaya already wanted to see an end to the violence, whereas ERP had embarked on an initiative which would require violence in San Salvador. Moreover, in his first two statements, Miranda put the blame on himself and on ERP. He had, and continues to have, a grasp of the facts.524 To the Commission, Miranda continued to deny his involvement. He even claimed that he had made up everything he had said about the murder and its planning. Nevertheless, he gave details of the murder and the way in which it was apparently planned that tally with other facts and that, according to our investigations, he had not given before. He provided information on: the time of a meeting held the night before the murder, where the pick-up truck came from, who obtained it and how he got to Anaya's parking lot in order to be able to act as look-out before the murder. The Government Salvadorian and international human rights organizations have expressed concern that the armed forces or a death squad may have killed Anaya in order to put an end to his criticisms of human rights violations.525 There is evidence that this could be true. According to his colleagues, Anaya received a number of direct and indirect threats from the Government throughout 1987. 526 According to a leader of CDHES-NG, two weeks before his murder a woman who worked for the Commission was arrested by the National Police, who informed her that they knew that Anaya was the leader of the organization and that "they were going to disrupt the entire work" of the organization.527 Throughout the 1980s, there were constant acts of violence against CDHES-NG and Anaya was the fourth leader of the Commission to be murdered or to disappear. Not one of these cases has been satisfactorily resolved.528 Moreover, according to Anaya's widow, at 6.10 a.m on the day of the murder, neighbours saw a group of National Police some 200 metres from the family's house.529 She argues that since the police were so close by, the murders could not have been from FMLN. FINDINGS The Commission finds that: 1. For this case, it did not have sufficient time to resolve the following dilemma: the fact that there was evidence showing that a State security force or a death squad might have been responsible, and also evidence that the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) might have been responsible for the murder of Herbert Ernesto Anaya Sanabria. 2. Miranda's trial and his treatment by the police violated his basic rights. 3. The State failed in its duty under international law to protect human rights, properly investigate the murder of Herbert Anaya and bring to trial and punish the culprits.
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